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The Senate's rejections of the nominations of Clement
Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court were the
second and third in the present century and the ninth and tenth nomi-
nees formally rejected by the Senate in the history of the Court., Not
since Grover Cleveland has a President had two successive nominees
to the same seat on the Supreme Court-or even two nomi-
nees-rejected by the Senate.2
That there should be two bitter battles over a Supreme Court
nomination is neither surprising nor, in itself, any cause for alarm.
When the Court is closely divided on current issues, any single ap-
pointment may be viewed as having a decisive impact on a wide range
of future decisions. Controversy over the Supreme Court nomina-
tions is but a healthy reflection of the key role which the Court plays
in the political system. Opposition to a presidential nominee is a
traditional and effective way of challenging and focusing attention
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1. The total excludes several nominations which were never confirmed but not formally
rejected by the Senate-for example, Fortas (1968) and Black (1859). Nominees formally
rejected were Rutledge (1795), Wolcott (1811), Spencer (1843), Woodward (1846), Hoar (1870),
Hornblower (1894), Peckham (1894), Parker (1930), Haynsworth (1969), and Carswell (1970).
A total of twenty-eight presidential nominees to the Supreme Court have failed to obtain senate
confirmation.
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTI-
CLE:
J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION (1965) [hereinafter cited as GROSSMAN];
A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956) [hereinafter cited as
MASON];
A. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1964) [hereinafter cited as TODD];
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary [on the Nominations of Lewis F.
Powell and William H. Rehnquist to the United States Supreme Court], 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Powell & Rehnquist].
2. Swindler, The Politics of"Advice and Consent," 56 A.B.A.J. 533, 536 (1970).
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upon the policies which that nominee is assumed to represent or
protesting the policies of the appointing President. In particular, if
the nominating President has announced the policy considerations
governing his choices for the Court, thus making the nomination a
major political issue, the battle lines are likely to be quickly drawn.
The focus of this article is not upon the politics or policies of the
President, his nominees, or their opponents. Rather, the primary
emphasis is upon the process of judicial recruitment. The defeats of
Judges Haynsworth and Carswell, following shortly after the contro-
versy over judicial ethics leading to the resignation of Justice Fortas,
suggest that at least for the foreseeable future Supreme Court nomi-
nees will receive far more scrutiny from the Senate than has tradition-
ally been the case. Indeed, the confrontation between President
Nixon's asserted constitutional prerogative to designate members of
the Court and the Senate's constitutional assignment to provide ad-
vice and consent on Supreme Court nominations3 has implications
beyond the immediate issue of the Court's political balance.
ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Attempting to shore up dwindling support for Judge Carswell's
nomination after Senate rejection of Judge Haynsworth, President
Nixon wrote to Senator William Saxbe, stating:
[w]hat is centrally at issue in this nomination is the constitutional responsibil-
ity of the President to appoint members of the Court-and whether this re-
sponsibility can be frustrated by those who wish to substitute their own philos-
ophy or their own subjective judgment for that of the one person entrusted by
the Constitution with the power of appointment. The question arises whether
I, as President of the United States, shall be accorded the same right of choice
in naming Supreme Court Justices which has been freely accorded to my
predecessors of both parties ....
* . . [I]f the Senate attempts to substitute its judgment as to who should be
appointed, the traditional constitutional balance is in jeopardy and the duty
of the President under the Constitution impaired.'
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
4. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to William Saxbe, March 31, 1970, in 116 CONG. Rec.
10158 (1970). While the intent of the letter was to persuade uncommitted senators to resolve
their doubts in favor of the claimed presidential prerogative, the letter may have had precisely
the opposite effect; indeed, it may have been the fatal blow to Judge Carswell's chances.
Senators, including those of the President's own party, are loyal to the Senate as an institution
and resist challenges to its power. Moreover, the letter challenging senatorial power and re-
asserting presidential hegemony, at a time when senators of both parties were sensitive to
assertions of presidential prerogative, may have sounded suspiciously similar to President
Johnson's defense of dispatching American troops to Vietnam and his attacks on those who
would deny the President the right to act in the national interest.
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The constitutional theory articulated by the President raises a
controversial issue, namely whether the President is entrusted with
the "right of choice" in naming justices and whether the Senate's role
is as modest as the President implied. During the twentieth century
the chief executive has largely enjoyed the prerogatives which Presi-
dent Nixon expressly claimed.5 These prerogatives did not, however,
stem from the Constitution but resulted from expansion of executive
power and acquiescence in the assertion of increased presidential
prerogatives by both the Senate and the general public.
The constitutional prescription of the Senate's role of "advice and
consent" has long been partially inoperative.6 Individual senators of
the President's party may wield substantial influence in the
nominations of lower federal court judges, even to the point of being
able to block a nomination of which they disapprove. 7 Although
lower court judgeships represent prime patronage opportunities for
senators of the President's party, Supreme Court nominations have
long been widely accepted as a presidential prerogative. Accordingly,
individual senators typically are neither consulted extensively nor
accorded substantial influence in the appointment process.
Once the President has made a nomination, however, legislative
participation in the process is ensured by the requirement of Senate
confirmation. In confirmation proceedings, the Senate has normally
limited its inquiry to whether a nominee's background included train-
ing, experience and judicial temperament deemed appropriate for the
position.8 Notwithstanding this customary practice, nominations
5. Cf. J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 314 (1953); Abraham &
Goldman, A Note on the Appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
46 A.B.A.J. 147, 222 (1960).
6. The most comprehensive treatment of the Senate's role in judicial appointments is J.
HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE (1953). See also GROSSMAN; R. HARRIS,
DECISION (1971); TODD; Abraham & Goldberg, supra note 5; Beiser, The Haynsworth Affair
Reconsidered: The Significance of Conflicting Perceptions of the Judicial Role, 23 VAND. L.
REV. 263 (1970); Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79
YALE L.J. 657 (1970); Thorpe, The Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 18 J. PUB. L. 371 (1969).
7. McKay, Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 KAN. L. REV. 109, 129
(1960). See Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process, 51 MINN. L. REV. 185, 188-91
(1966).
8. Neither the Constitution nor federal statutes prescribe any qualifications for a Supreme
Court Justice. It is legally possible, though scarcely conceivable, that a non-citizen, a minor or
a non-lawyer could be appointed to the Court. The pattern of recent appointments suggests
that a nominee will be a citizen, middle-aged, a practicing lawyer or politician, hold a law
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have been challenged by senators adhering to political viewpoints
different than those of the nominee;9 however, a political challenge
to a nominee has succeeded only on one prior occasion in the twen-
tieth century." Senators expect and normally grant to the President
the right to appoint to the Court men who share the President's own
political philosophy.
While President Nixon was factually correct in asserting that
rejection of Judge Carswell, especially in light of the Senate's rejec-
tion of Judge Haynsworth's nomination, would circumscribe the free-
dom "freely accorded to my predecessors of both parties,"' , he was
clearly mistaken in asserting that the sole constitutional responsibil-
ity to appoint justices rests with the President. Indeed, the contrary
position was aptly stated by Senator Griffin, who had earlier engi-
neered Republican strategy culminating in Justice Fortas' resigna-
tion:
There are some who suggest that the Senate's role is limited merely to ascer-
taining whether a nominee is qualified in the sense that he possesses some
minimum measure of academic background or experience. It should be em-
phasized at the outset that any such view of the Senate's function with respect
to nominations for the separate judicial branch of the government is wrong
and simply does not square with the precedents or with the intention of those
who conferred the "advice and consent" power upon the Senate.
Available historical evidence lends support to the view that the
Senate was intended to undertake an independent evaluation of a
degree from an accredited, and more often than not, prestigious law school, be almost always
of the same political persuasion as the President, and, until at least the present, be a male.
9. See W. Burris, John J. Parker and Supreme Court Policy: A Case Study in Judicial
Control, 1965 (unpublished thesis in University of North Carolina Library). However, nomina-
tions to the Supreme Court in the 18th and 19th centuries were expected to be subject to
politically motivated attacks. The rejection of Rutledge in 1795 was primarily a result of the
nominee's views on the Jay Treaty. I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES
HISTORY 124-38 (1922). Other examples of nominations rejected, at least partially, on partisan
grounds would include Wolcott's in 1811, id. at 410-13, Crittenden's in 1829, 2 id. at 160-64,
and the failure to confirm Black for his views on slavery and secession in, 3 id. at 86. A
perusal of Professor Warren's book will reveal many additional instances.
10. Swindler, supra note 2, at 536.
11. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to William Saxbe, March 31, 1970, in 116 CONG. REc.
10158 (1970). See text accompanying note 4 supra.
12. 116 CONG. REC. 10183-84 (1970). Griffin was writing at the time of the Fortas contro-
versy, presumably in defense of his mobilization of the anti-Fortas bloc. Senator Tydings, in
connection with the Carswell debate, introduced Griffin's views. Ironically, the position had
been adopted a number of years earlier by William Rehnquist, as his opponents were fond of
pointing dut. See Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, HARv. L, REc., Oct. 8,
1959, at 7.
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nominee's qualifications. For example, Hamilton anticipated that the
Senate would fully consider the qualifications of nominees,13 al-
though he did argue that a nominee should not be rejected merely
because the Senate preferred a different candidate. 4
In support of President Nixon's position, the argument may be
made that, as with Cabinet appointments, a presumption of fitness
should be enjoyed by a presidential nominee, and that, accordingly,
the Senate should sustain a heavy burden of proof before rejecting a
candidate. However, this argument is fundamentally unsound be-
cause of obvious differences between the functions, as well as tenure,
of Cabinet officers and Supreme Court Justices.15 In addition to the
limited duration of office holding inherent in a Cabinet post, execu-
tive positions are distinguishable from Supreme Court posts on the
grounds that incompetence or malfeasance displayed in the former
offices will result in negative political consequences for the President.
Supreme Court Justices, on the other hand, are not "the President's
men"; therefore, presidential responsibility for the conduct of justices
is severely attentuated. Moreover, in the highly politicized circum-
stances surrounding the nomination of Judge Carswell, it was diffi-
cult for the President to argue convincingly that the Senate, in consid-
ering a Court nomination, should not concern itself with factors
which originally prompted the President's action itself. Having made
a nomination for express policy and partisan reasons, the President
could not reasonably expect the Senate to react in a non-partisan
fashion.
Even if the President's constitutional arguments were more defen-
sible, it would have been difficult to convince the Senate to adopt his
view in the Carswell case. Constitutionally prescribed roles for judi-
13. If it be said [the Senate] might sometimes gratify [the President] by an acquies-
cense in a favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a different conduct, I
answer that the instances in which the President could be personally interested in the
result, would be too few to admit of his being materially affected by the compliances of
the Senate. The POWER which can originate the disposition of honors and emoluments,
is more likely to attract than to be attracted by the POWER which can merely obstruct
their course. If by influencing the President be meant restraining him, this is precisely
what must have been intended. And it has been shown that the restraint would be
salutory, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to
be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate. The right of nomination
would produce all the good of that appointment, and would in great measure avoid its
evils. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 485-86 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
See id. No. 76, at 483 (A. Hamilton); GROSSMAN 26-27; J. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 27-28.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
15. See Black, supra note 6, at 659-60.
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cial selection, it must be remembered, were devised before the advent
of the party system, and the process as it has evolved bears only slight
resemblance to that envisioned by the framers. Thus, the primary
question was not only whether the President was asserting a more
"correct" view of the constitutional issue, but whether it was politi-
cally tenable for the Senate to accept it. In most Supreme Court and
lower federal court nominations, the Senate does not experience a
conflict of pressures between claimed presidential prerogatives and
the legislative role of conducting an independent evaluation of a nom-
inee's competence. Ordinarily, the nominee is qualified; conse-
quently, in such circumstances no compelling reason exists to dissent
from the tradition of deference to presidential choice. Where conflict-
ing pressures do exist, however, deference becomes less tenable, and
the Senate is forced to give full consideration to the qualifications of
a Supreme Court nominee."6
16. By what criteria should a senator decide to vote for or against a Supreme Court
nominee? An individual senator's policy is undoubtedly the result of a number of factors,
including party loyalty, loyalty to the President, and the impact of a vote on the senator's
constituents. Inertia and tradition always favor a vote for confirmation-or at least no recorded
opposition-although these factors may be given different weight when applied to Cabinet and
Supreme Court nominations. In the debate over confirmation of Lewis F. Powell and William
H. Rehnquist, two senators spoke directly to this question. Senator Javits (R., N.Y.) articulated
the following six-point test for confirmation: a Supreme Court nominee should display (1) a
high commitment to freedom, dignity and justice for all citizens; (2) a high level of professional
competence as a lawyer and personal integrity; (3) high intellectual ability and a recognition
of broad social, economic and governmental concerns; (4) a sense of objectivity and an under-
standing of the Supreme Court's role; (5) an understanding of the constitutional limits of the
executive and legislative branches with respect to individual liberties, especially where the poor
and unpopular groups are concerned; (6) an understanding of the constitutional limits on
judicial power. 117 CONG. Rac. 16602 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1971). Since he voted to oppose
confirmation, one may assume that Senator Javits believed Rehnquist deficient in one or more
of these categories. More important for present purposes, these standards suggest the need for
an independent consideration of a nominee's qualifications by the Senate, rather than a passive
acquiescence in a presidential choice.
On the other hand, Senator Proxmire (D., Wis.) announced that he would-and did-vote
for Mr. Rehnquist's confirmation. Recalling that he had opposed Judge Haynsworth because
of the conflict of interest allegations, and Judge Carswell because of lack of ability, Senator
Proxmire stated that the Senate should confirm a nominee of obvious intellectual ability, such
as Rehnquist, without consideration of any substantive views which he might hold, unless it
could be shown that the nominee did not understand or would not support the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional protections. 117 CONG. REc. 20827 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1971). Thus,
while Senator Proxmire found insufficient negative characteristics about Rehnquist to vote in
opposition, Senator Javits articulated an affirmative test which placed the burden of proof on
a nominee or his supporters.
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ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE PROCESS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION
Supreme Court nominations 7 are normally referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee for investigation and public hearings.' Upon
completion of the hearings, the nomination, accompanied by the
Committee's report, is sent to the Senate floor.
To determine the rapidity of Senate action on nominations, two
factors must be examined: first, the interval between the nomination
and its being reported by the Committee to the Senate; and, second,
the interval between the date of the Committee report and the
Senate's vote on confirmation. One crude index of the level of contro-
versy surrounding a nomination is the length of the Senate Commit-
tee hearings. The Committee hearings tend to beproforma in charac-
ter where nominations are non-controversial. If there is significant
opposition, however, the hearings may be used either to mobilize
support for a nominee by eliciting testimony from favorable witnesses
or to mobilize opposition by presentation of adverse testimony. How-
ever, considering both time lapse factors, it should be noted that de-
lay may also be used to advance or protect senatorial political for-
tunes and may, therefore, indicate little about the actual level of
substantive controversy; it may symbolize senatorial unrest over a
key political issue with which the nominee is prominently associated;
it may represent an indirect attack on the Supreme Court itself as
an expression of senatorial unhappiness with particular decisions;
and, finally, delay may represent an attack on the President rather
than the nominee. One-day hearings have definitely been the rule in
the past. In only fourteen of the nominations has more than one day
of hearings been conducted, and in only four instances have more
than four days been involved. 9 However, the "one-day" rule has
17. Although the Senate has rejected only three nominations since the Hornblower-
Wheeler-Peckham rejections of 1894, in the twentieth century there have been fifty-one Su-
preme Court nominations, including nominations to the position of Chief Justice. This total,
through the end of 1971, includes the nomination of Justice White, who originally reached the
Court before 1900 and became Chief Justice in 1910; the two nominations of Harlan Stone,
first appointed in 1925 and named Chief Justice in 1941; and Abe Fortas, nominated in 1965,
and then unsuccessfully nominated to be Chief Justice in 1968. Charles Evans Hughes was
nominated in 1910 and then again in 1930, after he had resigned from his initial service. The
nomination of Abe Fortas was withdrawn after the Senate failed to vote cloture on the debate,
and the nomination of Judge Homer Thornberry was withdrawn at the same time.
18. For a discussion of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, see GROSSMAN 156-95.
19. Hearings on Thurgood Marshall's nomination lasted five days, Clement Haynsworth,
eight days, and Abe Fortas, eleven days. The longest were those on Louis D. Brandeis, where
the Committee held nineteen days of hearings in addition to taking an additional six days for
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recently weakened, and, since 1950, a majority of hearings have ex-
tended for at least two days.20
A second partial index of the level of controversy surrounding a
nomination is the time elapsing between the nomination by the Presi-
dent and a final vote by the Senate. In only two cases in this century
have more than one hundred days elapsed beteeen the nomination
and the Senate Judiciary Committee's report.2' In no other cases did
more than seventy days elapse between the nomination and the Com-
mittee's report.2 2 However, arrangement of the nominations in chron-
ological order shows a definite increase in the period of time as the
years have passed. The interval between report by the Committee and
confirmation or rejection has normally been quite brief.23 Rarely has
the Senate devoted more than two days for debate of Supreme Court
nominations,24 and in only a few cases has any period of time elapsed
Committee consideration. Two-day hearings were devoted to the nominations of John Mar-
shall Harlan, William Brennan, Potter Stewart and William Rehnquist. The hearings for
Robert Jackson, Tom Clark and Earl Warren each consumed three days, and those for Felix
Frankfurter and Harlan Stone (his first nomination) took four days each. An attempt to reopen
hearings on William Rehnquist for an additional day failed by a vote of ten to five.
20. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings extended at least two days for eight of the fifteen
nominees during the period in question.
21. The time elapsing between the nomination of and the Committee report on Louis
Brandeis involved one hundred and twenty-two days, that of Potter Stewart one hundred and
ten days. While the Committee's consideration of Brandeis has come to be recognized as a
classic example of controversy and delay, the length of time in the Stewart case (measuring
only the time after Eisenhower submitted his name to the Senate) resulted from the Senate's
increasing irritation with the practice of recess appointments-Stewart was the third Eisen-
hower recess appointee. The comparable figure for Warren, the first recess appointee, was
forty-nine days, and for Brennan, the second such appointee, sixty-three days.
22. The nominations of Marshall and Haynsworth took sixty-nine days to reach the report
stage; other significant delays in descending order were Harlan (59), Fortas (55), Warren (49),
Carswell (39), Parker (32), Butler and Goldberg (25), Rutledge (21), Burger (19) and Jackson
(18). The contrast between the sixty-nine days for Haynsworth and thirty-nine days for Carswell
may be explained by the Committee's desire to fill a position on the Court which had remained
vacant distressingly long and a feeling of confidence that Carswell would not encounter the
same difficulties as Haynsworth. For Powell and Rehnquist, the figures are thirty-four days
from the nomination to Committee vote, and forty-one days from nomination to the filing of
minority views. Attempts to treat the nominations separately, with opposition focused on
Rehnquist, were unsuccessful despite an alleged "trade-off" within the Committee whereby
there would be no opposition to Powell in exchange for an opportunity to defeat Rehnquist.
23. However, fifteen days elapsed before the vote on John Parker, on five of which the
Senate debated the nomination.
24. The Senate took seven days, however, on Haynsworth's nomination, and five days with
each of the nominations of Rehnquist, Stone and Fortas, the latter when Justice Fortas was
nominated for the post of Chief Justice. Three days were devoted to Hughes' initial nomination.
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between report and the vote on confirmation.21
In addition to the time lapse between submission of the nomina-
tion by the President and Senate action, and the length of considera-
tion of the nomination in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings,
the pattern of Senate voting in Committee and on the floor provides
a third index of the controversy generated by a nomination. In only
three of the fifty-one nominations (six percent) have as few as four
votes separated the two sides in Committee.6 Committee votes were
unanimously favorable in seventy-five percent of the nominations;
however, in the last two decades there has been an increasing number
of split roll-call votes, with an increasing number of members in the
minority. 27 Nonetheless, the only Committee vote adverse to the
nominee was the ten to six vote against Judge Parker in 1930.5
Voting on confirmation by the Senate follows much the same
pattern-approval by either a unanimous or a decisive majority vote.
Most nominees to the high court have been confirmed by voice vote.29
However, the votes on three rejections were close. In the case of
Judge Parker (thirty-nine for, forty-one against), a shift of one vote
could have led to confirmation." Judge Haynsworth's defeat was by
a decisive fifty-five to forty-five margin, while Judge Carswell's
nomination was rejected fifty-one to forty-five. A motion to recom-
mit the latter's nomination to the Judiciary Committee was defeated
fifty-two to forty-four immediately prior to the final vote.
There are record votes on only twenty (thirty-nine percent) of the
nominations in the twentieth century, although presently there is an
increasing likelihood that a roll call vote will occur and that there will
25. Seven days elapsed between the report and vote on the nominations of Jackson and
Rutledge; in the case of Marshall, nine days elapsed. There are no other delays of note, and it
is hard to call even these periods "delays" because of their brevity. From the Committee's vote
on the nominations until the confirmation vote, thirteen days elapsed for Powell and seventeen
for Rehnquist.
26. Those were the nominations of Parker, Brandeis, and Haynsworth. See notes 27-28
infra.
27. There were only five nominations with at least five negative votes-Parker, Brandeis,
Haynsworth, Marshall and Fortas; four more with four negative votes-Black, Harlan,
Carswell and Rehnquist; two with three negative votes-Warren and Stewart; and four others
with one or two negative votes. Thus, in only twenty-five percent of the nominations were there
any opposing votes in the Judiciary Committee.
28. The only other close votes were those involving Brandeis (10-8 for), and Haynsworth
(10-7 for).
29. A nominee has never been rejected by voice vote. See Swindler, supra note 2, at 536.
30. Because Hoover's Vice-President, Charles Curtis, was presiding over the Senate, he
presumably would have broken the tie in favor of the nominee.
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be some opposition to a nomination in light of increased legislative
scrutiny. Despite this trend, there have been only nine instances
(eighteen percent) in which there were as many as ten negative votes,
and seven of these have occurred since 1949.1' That unanimous and
nearly unanimous votes are.not completely a thing of the past, how-
ever, is demonstrated by Justice Blackmun's unanimous confirmation
and Justice Powell's confirmation by a vote of eighty-nine to one.
From a chronological examination of the votes cast, it is clear
that the Senate's voting shows less of a pattern or trend toward
controversy than has been the case in consideration of nominations
by the Committee on the Judiciary, where the most substantial splits
in voting have occurred in recent nominations. There has been no
consistent growth in the extent of voting opposition to Supreme
Court nominees. Indeed, the nominees, if confirmed, have received
the support of a substantial majority of the Senate, even if delay and
controversy were associated with the nomination."
ADVICE AND CONSENT: FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE IN
CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS
In the remainder of this article, we will examine the reasons why
a nomination might meet with opposition in the Senate and perhaps
be rejected. The rejections of Judges Parker, Carswell and Hayns-
worth will be emphasized, but the nominations of Brandeis, Stone,
Harlan, Black, Rehnquist, Powell, and two Eisenhower recess ap-
pointees-Warren and Brennan-will also be considered. Assuming
both that the "burden of proof" against confirmation must be borne
by the opposition and that the institutional machinery will otherwise
31. An additional six nominees received what might be called "token" negative votes.
Butler and Clark each had eight votes cast against them; the nominations of McReynolds and
Stone (1926) each received six negative votes; Douglas received four negative votes; Burger
received three votes in opposition, and Powell only one. Of the nominees confirmed by a divided
vote, in three instances the negative vote approached one-half of the positive vote. Pitney was
confirmed in 1912 by a 50-26 vote, Brandeis' nomination was confirmed by a 47-22 margin,
and Hughes was confirmed by a 52-26 tally. There have been at least ten senators voting against
confirmation in six other instances-Black (63-16), Minton (48-16), Harlan (71-11), Stewart
(70-17), Marshall (69-11) and Rehnquist (68-26). After a motion to close off debate on the
Rehnquist nomination failed, receiving only a 40-52 positive vote, a motion to delay the confir-
mation vote for five weeks failed, 22-70.
What is perhaps unusual about the size of the negative vote in the cases of Black and Minton
is that both were senators, and it is the "conventional wisdom" that the Senate readily accepts
"its own" when nominated by the President to another federal office.
32. See generally Abraham & Goldberg, supra note 5.
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operate in favor of confirmation, there appear to be instances in
which controversy is more likely, and, as a corollary, acceptance of
a nomination less likely.
Senate action appears to depend upon three factors. The first,
obviously, is the suitability of the nominee himself. Although this
factor necessarily involves a subjective judgment, several "informal"
indicators are typically considered in confirmation proceedings. The
nominee's performance as a lower court judge may come under ex-
tensive scrutiny, or, if he is not a nominee from the bench, his record
in any legislative or administrative position formerly held will be
considered as a means of assessing his judicial philosophy-his gen-
eral predilection toward activism or restraint and, more specifically,
the manner in which he would likely act when confronted with partic-
ular cases. In addition, senators frequently examine the nominee's
past political involvement in determining suitability." Moreover,
judicial ethics has become a highly important consideration as
charges of conflict of interest multiply in appointments in all
branches of government. In a complex society with economic power
interlocked among numerous disparate organizations, it is increas-
ingly likely that, by being at least indirectly involved with such organ-
izations, a prospective public official's ability to maintain independ-
ence of judgment will be questioned. Particularly in light of the resig-
nation of Justice Fortas, it is unlikely that any subsequent nominee
will be able to avoid an extended examination of the ethical standards
displayed in his professional activities. The forthrightness with which
Lewis Powell dealt with the matter of his stock and property hold-
ings, as well as his submission of a financial statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, further supports this assertion.34
The strategy of the President, the second relevant factor, will also
influence the final outcome. The extent of presidential commitment
to effecting confirmation may determine the tactics which the White
House will adopt in attempting to sway potentially recalcitrant sena-
tors. Moreover, the degree of public support which the President is
33. See, e.g., Hearings on Powell & Rehnquist 42-43 (Rehnquist), 233-34 (Powell);
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary ton the Nomination of John M. Harlan
to the Supreme Court], 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-27, 143 (1955); Senators Bayh, Hart, Kennedy
& Tydings, Memorandum on the Qualifications of G. Harrold Carswellfor the Supreme Court
of the United States, reprinted in 116 CONG. Rac. 7360, 7364 (1970).
34. Judge Carswell also took, a similar course of action. Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary [on the Nomination of G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court], 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1970).
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willing to give the nominee after the initial nomination is made is a
critical element of White House strategy, especially in circumstances
of substantial opposition to the nominee. In addition to actions of the
President, a further component of strategic considerations is the pub-
lic conduct of and tactics utilized by the nominee. The course of the
nominee's behavior during the confirmation process may be guided,
at least in part, by White House strategists.
The final factor relevant to Senate disposition of the nomination
is the group support or opposition which the nominee receives. Ob-
viously, one critical group is the bench and bar, especially when the
nominee is a member of the bench at the time of his nomination.
Other vital groups include organized economic blocs, such as labor
organizations, and public interest groups which adopt an active role
in attempting to influence legislative decision-making.
Suitability of the Nominee
Prior Judicial Service. If the nominee has served as a lower
court judge, his suitability depends in large part on the decisions he
promulgated in that capacity. All three nominees rejected in this
century were lower court judges, a factor tending to indicate the
vulnerability which such service may bring and which could perhaps
inhibit the President's selection of one whose judicial record is at least
partly known. Judges Parker and Haynsworth were, at the time of
their nominations, members of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and accordingly, the proper role of a federal appellate judge
became an issue with respect to both nominations.35 In each case,
allegations were made that the nominees were too conservative.
Judge Parker's defenders argued that his controversial rulings indi-
cated only that the judge was implementing the law as established by
the Supreme Court.36 Defenders of Judge Haynsworth argued that
the nominee had not attempted to obstruct or evade compliance with
Brown v. Board of Education,3 and that, at the time they were
made, his key decisions in school desegregation cases, though later
35. For a discussion of the comparison between the nominations and rejections of
Haynsworth and Parker, see Grossman & Wasby, Haynsworth and Parker: History Does Live
Again, 23 S.C.L. REv. 345 (1971).
36. H. HOOVER, MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY
1920-1933, at 268-69 (1952).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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reversed, were an accurate interpretation of the Brown decision.38
Supreme Court precedents are only part, albeit a significant part,
of the factors considered by the lower court judge in his decision-
making. They are not the whole directing force behind his work,
despite their binding nature. While Supreme Court opinions create
pressure in one direction, more specific pressure may derive from the
emotions of the area to be affected by a decision. The federal judge,
as a resident in a district or circuit and a product in part of the local
political machinery (even if he is not an active member in the party,
his selection involved the party), is responsive to the social, economic
and political values of the area. A study of Southern federal judges
after Brown shows that while "[jiudges will do what they are told by
the United States Supreme Court. . .none of them. . . are particu-
larly anxious to attack strongly entrenched local institutions, [and
that] the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's instructions has been
resolved to conform to the dominant political forces of the South." 9
While some pressures are centrifugal and lead the lower court judge
away from the Supreme Court's rulings, it is not the case that, other
things being equal, lower court judges will not follow the high court's
rulings. Rather, many judges have in fact closely followed Supreme
Court precedent.40 However, even if a lower court judge scrupulous-
ly adheres to precedents, notwithstanding local pressures favoring a
different approach, compliance with Supreme Court directives may
have high costs. For example, UMW v. Red Jacket Consolidated
Coal & Coke Co.4 was decided by Judge Parker on the authority of
the Supreme Court's decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell" unholding "yellow-dog" contracts. In arguing against
Judge Parker's confirmation, opponents claimed that the Red Jacket
injunction was overly broad, that he had gone beyond what precedent
required of him, and that he had ignored American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,43 which followed and limited
Hitchman Coal. However, consideration of decisions by Parker
38. 115 CONG. REC. 34568 (remarks of Senator Baker), 35130 (remarks of Senator
McClellan), 35132 (remarks of Senator Cook) (1969).
39. See J. PELTASON, FiFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 246 (1961).
40. Parker, for example, was consistent with the Supreme Court in 64 of 72 cases. Of the
eight cases where he was not, seven had no controlling Supreme Court precedent, leaving only
one of seventy-two in which he was in conflict with the high court. W. Burris, supra note 9.
41. Rowe v. Peyton, 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).
42. 245 U.S. 229 (1918).
43. 257 U.S. 184 (1922).
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dealing with a wide range of subjects substantiates the argument
that Parker was an obedient follower of a conservative Supreme
Court rather than a conservative masquerading as a judge." Sim-
ilarly, in the debates concerning the nomination of Judge Hayns-
worth, controversy focused in part upon his decision with respect to
the power of company officials to close plants in the face of impend-
ing unionization. Supporters of Judge Haynsworth's nomination
argued that the decision in favor of the company followed existing
Supreme Court doctrine at the time, although the Court changed the
rule in reversing the judge when the case was appealed. Pressing the
attack that Haynsworth was an anti-union judge, opponents pointed
out that, when the Supreme Court reversed Haynsworth in labor-
management cases, it did so unanimously in all but one instance."
The problem of a fast-moving Supreme Court most clearly af-
fected Haynsworth in the area of race relations. The Supreme Court,
finally frustrated by the slow response to its ambiguous "with all
deliberate speed" order of Brown v. Board of Education," began to
move quickly in the late 1960's and found some of the rulings from
the Fourth Circuit, as well as from other circuits, to be improper.,
Whether this made Haynsworth a segregationist, however, is quite
another matter.48 A comparison of his position with that of his judi-
cial brethren at the time he made his particular decisions show that
Haynsworth was not notably out of line and clearly was not lagging
behind what the Supreme Court appeared to be saying.
An evaluation of Judge Haynsworth's performance depends upon
whether one expects a lower court judge to anticipate decisions of the
Supreme Court and to adjust his philosophy accordingly. Signifi-
44. W. Burris, supra note 9. In support of the position that Parker was anti-union and not
simply an obedient lower court judge, it can be argued that Parker ignored the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), which was passed after Hitchman Coal and limited the holding of
that case. However, it should be remembered that the Supreme Court had severely limited the
labor protection provided in that statute. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (1921).
45. 115 CONG. REC. 34428 (1969) (remarks of Senator Metcalf.
46. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
47. See Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, revg per curian, Gilliam v. School Bd., 345
F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965) (Haynsworth, J.) and Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.
1965) (Haynsworth, J.).
48. In the words of Senator Clifford Case, Haynsworth had shown "persistent reluctance
to accept, and considerable legal ingenuity to avoid" the mandate of Brown and other similar
cases. 115 CONG. REc. 35130 (1969). For a more sympathetic view of Haynsworth's handling
of school desegregation cases, see the statement by Professor G.W. Foster to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Id. at 34453.
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cantly, Haynsworth was not notably reluctant to anticipate the Court
in other areas of the law. His innovative decision on the right of
prisoners to have convictions reviewed on habeas corpus was upheld
by the Supreme Court in a decision praising Haynsworth.49 His sup-
porters also pointed to his order desegregating the North Carolina
Dental Society"0 as an instance of judicial statesmanship. It could be
concluded that Haynsworth's reluctance to anticipate school integra-
tion decisions of the Supreme Court reflected personal policy prefer-
ences rather than a desire to follow precedent. However, it must be
noted that it took the Supreme Court fourteen years to decide that
the Brown decision required affirmative steps toward integration51
rather than a mere dismantling of the legal barriers to integration,
and fifteen years elapsed before school districts were required to
proceed in this direction with more than "deliberate speed. '5 2
Judge Carswell had not been on the Court of Appeals for a suffi-
cient period of time to permit a realistic evaluation of his perform-
ance as an appellate judge. His supporters, however, relied upon his
temporary service with the Court of Appeals prior to his appointment
as a full member of that body to demonstrate his experience as an
appellate judge.53 Opponents pointed to the rate at vhich the Fifth
Circuit reversed his decisions, while supporters argued that there were
occasions when the Court of Appeals was, in turn, reversed by the
Supreme Court, or that Supreme Court decisions handed down after
his rulings led the Court of Appeals to reverse him.54 However, it
should be noted that the rate at which Carswell was reversed had
increased over the period of his judgeship.55
49. Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967), affd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
50. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soe'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
51. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
52. Alexander v. County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
53. 116 CONG. REc. 7673 (1970).
54. See Hearings [on the Nomination of G. Harrold Carswell], supra note 34, at 311-15.
55. The most damaging figures on Carswell's reversal record came from the Ripon Society.
It reported that Carswell was reversed more frequently than a sample of district judges either
in all circuits or in the Fifth Circuit alone. Carswell was also cited less frequently than a sample
of other judges and used far fewer case citations and secondary sources than other judges. 116
CONG. REc. 7493-94 (1970). Another study shows that only six of the sixty-seven district judges
in the Fifth Circuit were reversed more frequently than Carswell. Id. at 10159 (remarks of
Senator Bayh). A similar report on California Judge Mildred Lillie's reversals was apparently
instrumental in the widespread lack of enthusiasm for her expected nomination to the Supreme
Court. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1971, at 23, col. 1.
A possible explanation for Carswell's reversal record is that he was willing to lend greater
weight to the social values and political attitudes widely held in his region than the appellate
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Political Involvement. In his confirmation proceeding, Brandeis
was alleged to be lacking "proper judicial temperament"-a phrase
which has come to be conveniently used to encompass a wide variety
of derelictions to which its users want to refer. Although on the
surface, such a statement would seem to refer to ability as a judge, it
usually masks criticism of the ideology he is likely to pursue while
on the bench. Despite his wealth, Brandeis had been the friend of or,
more accurately, the advocate for, the average citizen. His attacks on
the utilities and his defense of minimum wage and maximum hour
statutes incurred the wrath of many leaders of the bar."
While no specific charges of wrong-doing were proven, the quant-
ity and frequency of the charges caused a long delay in the processing
of the nomination and created the impression that wrong-doing was
involved." President Wilson's firm support of Brandeis, particularly
when Brandeis was under attack, likely played a major part in deflat-
ing the opposition to the nomination."
The controversy over Hugo Black's nomination in 1937 involved
racial issues and, of more significance, the propriety of nominating a
senator. While it is often assumed that the issue of Black's having
been a member of the Ku Klux Klan interfered with confirmation,
the issue in fact arose mainly after confirmation. Another contro-
versy surrounding the nomination stemmed from the claim that be-
cause Black, as a senator, had voted for a new retirement system for
court decisions would warrant. The very fact that he was nominated to the Supreme Court
suggests the possible gains from persistent adherence to a regional ideology.
56. William Howard Taft, ex-President and future Chief Justice, and other prestigious
lawyers wrote letters attacking Brandeis. One observer commented that "[n]o such rallying of
the leaders of the American bar has been seen in the capital before, on any issue." TODD 160.
See also GROSSMAN 181-95.
57. See TODD 96-127.
58. See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 465-508 (1946); TODD 37-39, 133-39.
59. See R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 106 (1971), where the
author argues that Black misled the Senate into believing that stories about his KKK member-
ship were false.
The issue of Black's KKK membership was injected into one debate over Carswell's nomi-
nation, when Senator Holland (D., Fla.) introduced a Florida newspaper editorial claiming that
if Black could rise above KKK membership, Carswell could rise above his racist statement.
116 CONG. REc. 10260 (1970). On the other side, the Dean of the Yale Law School, Louis
Pollak, pointed out that Senator Black, as a lawyer, had vigorously represented black citizens
in Alabama. Id. 2860 (1970). Professor William Van Alstyne emphasized that while Black's
principles about human rights were quite clear from his service as a senator, the same was not
true of Carswell's activities. Van Alstyne expressed considerable concern over the fact that even
after the 1948 speech, Carswell had not engaged in any "reassuring conduct," but instead, only
a continuing pattern of involvement in segregationist activities. Id. at 2858.
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Supreme Court Justices, which included retirement at full pay, he was
ineligible to serve on the Court since he would benefit from "emolu-
ments" he had helped establishA In addition, some senators were
upset over the practice by which the Senate did not give the same
intensive scrutiny to nominees from its own chambers that it did to
outsiders-a "senatorial courtesy" of a different sort. Those making
the argument were opposed to Black and wanted a full investigation.
The charge was also made that, after his court-packing defeat, Presi-
dent Roosevelt had to use the Senate in order to get a New Dealer
on the Court to save his economic programs. 61
John Marshall Harlan, nominated in 1955, was questioned about
his membership in the Atlantic Union.6 1 In response, Harlan stated
that he would not surrender United States sovereignty in favor of a
world government. 3 Another less crucial objection was that he was
affiliated with the "Dewey-Brownell wing" of the Republican Party.
William Brennan's nomination in 1956 was contested in commit-
tee by Senator Joseph McCarthy. 4 McCarthy wanted to know where
Brennan stood on matters of internal security and berated the nomi-
nee for criticizing the methods of anti-communist investigations. 5
Carefully attempting to avoid commenting on cases *pending before
the Court of which he was already a sitting member, Brennan indi-
cated that he supported the use of congressional investigations-
McCarthy's chief tool.66
60. J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS 99 (1949).
61. MASON 467, 487.
62. Hearings [on the Nomination of John Marshall Harlan], supra note 33, at 129-47, 155-
58, 170-82. Harlan was also asked about matters which related to cases which might come
before him as a judge and about a previous Supreme Court decision. In both instances, Harlan
refused to offer an answer, stating that to do so would be "inappropriate" or "improper." Id.
at 137-138, 166-67. Harlan also gave no opinion of the Bricker Amendment, first proposed in
1952, which would have restricted the President's power to enter into executive agreements with
foreign governments. He did add, however, that if the Constitution were amended, he would
endeavor to uphold it as amended. Id. at 172-73.
63. Id. at 139, 142. In reply to a question of Senator Dirksen (R., Ill.), Harlan said that
he had joined the Atlantic Union at the suggestion of Justice Owen Roberts, believing it to be
against Communism, and that membership did not reflect any negative attitude about national
sovereignty. Id. at 155. See also Thorpe, supra note 6, at 384-85.
64. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary [on the Nomination of William
Joseph Brennan, Jr.], 85th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5-6 (1957).
65. Id. at 17-19.
66. Id. Brennan received the support of Senator Dirksen, but his chief advantage was the
strong endorsement he had received from Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, of which Brennan had been a member. This support and that of the bar was
sufficient to overcome the opposition of Senators McCarthy and Eastland. Eastland had been
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It was alleged that Carswell was intellectually incapable of
handling the job of Supreme Court Justice. 7 Further, a variety of his
actions indicated a commitment to racial segregation. While most
senators were willing to forgive Carswell's allegedly racist campaign
speech in 1948,6" other evidence, such as the signing of the incorpora-
tion papers which transformed a municipal golf club in Tallahassee
into a private club to avoid desegregation, being a charter member
of a private white men's club, and signing a deed to property which
contained a racially restrictive covenant, indicated that the speech
was not an isolated incident, but was part of a pattern which contin-
ued through the 1960's.69 The accumulation of such evidence embar-
rassed senators committed to voting for Carswell. Florida's Republi-
can Gurney, who might have been expected to take the lead in press-
ing for confirmation of a nominee from his own state, did little more
than read letters of support from his constituents into the
Congressional Record.70 Many other senators who voted for Carswell
were unable to give him any additional support beyond their votes.
Carswell's opponents also pointed to his alleged lack of candor
in his appearance before the Committee. This charge can be illus-
trated by Carswell's actions in connection with the Tuttle letter. For-
mer Chief Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit wrote a letter to the
Committee indicating both his willingness to testify as well as his
confidence in Carswell as a judge. This letter was inserted in the
hearings record. A few days later, but before Carswell's appearance,
Tuttle telephoned Carswell, stating that he could no longer testify in
support of the nomination. After Carswell's appearance, Tuttle, re-
sponding to an inquiry by Senator Tydings, characterized the letter
as nothing more than an offer to testify, and further asserted that he,
Tuttle, had "concluded that he could not testify in support of Cars-
well's nomination."7 Senator Tydings, while expressly declining to
delaying the confirmation process because he disliked approving another liberal for a position
on the Court.
67. Hearings [on the Nomination of G. Harrold Carswell], supra note 34, at 239-42,
68. Carswell said, in part: "I believe that segregation of the races is proper and the only
correct way of life in our state. I have always so believed and I shall always so act . . . I yield
to no man . . . in the firm, vigorous belief in the principles of white supremacy and I shall
always be so governed." Reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 7853 (Mar. 18, 1970).
69. Memorandum on the Qualifications of G. Harrold Carswell, supra note 33.
70. 116 CONG. REC. 7654-55 (1970).
71. Id. at 7670. Tuttle further stated that he was "surprised to learn later that the letter
was used for a purpose inconsistent with my decision not to testify as communicated
directly to Judge Carswell." Id. at 7672 (emphasis added).
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charge Carswell with deliberate deception, urged senators to draw
their own conclusions from Carswell's failure to withdraw the letter
from the nomination record.7 2
When Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist were nominated, op-
position centered on the latter, probably because of his conduct and
views with respect to civil rights. On the other hand, opposition to
Powell, at sixty-four the fourth-oldest nominee in the Court's history,
was based upon what Congress' Black Caucus viewed as his inade-
quate performance concerning compliance with Brown while a mem-
ber of the Richmond, Virginia School Board and the Virginia State
Board of Education. 73 Questions were also raised with respect to his
occupying directorship posts in corporations which the Caucus be-
lieved to be in violation of the equal employment provisions of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.74
Opposition to Rehnquist, primarily by the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights and joined by the American Civil Liberties Union
(opposing a nominee to public office for the first time in its history),
was premised upon his opposition to the passage of a municipal
public accommodations ordinance at a time when the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was at final passage stage75 and his alleged participation
in attempts in 1964 to deprive Arizona blacks of the vote.76 Rehn-
qtlist's earlier defense of Carswell in a letter to the Washington Post
also drew the Leadership Conference's anger.77 Further, Rehnquist's
work as Assistant Attorney General on matters such as electronic
surveillance and mass demonstrations led others to attack him for
failure to appreciate the mandates of the Bill of Rights, despite argu-
ments that he was only serving as the government's lawyer. 7 Rehn-
quist's assertion that the lawyer-client relationship between him and
the rest of the executive branch made it impossible for him to divulge
positions he had taken did not mollify liberal opponents. To this
argument, opponents responded that he had indicated the intellectual
compatibility of his views with those of the Justice Department.
Of particular interest was the charge, introduced quite late in the
72. Senator Eastland indicated that Tuttle had never requested withdrawal of the letter,
which Eastland described as a "blanket endorsement." Id. at 7671.
73. Hearings on Powell & Rehnquist 381-82.
74. Id. at 384.
75. Id. at 307 (letter from Rehnquist to the Editor of the Arizona Republic).
76. Id. at 485-86, 489-94.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 313, 355, 356, 403, 445.
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campaign against Rehnquist's confirmation, that, while serving in
1952 as a clerk for Justice Robert Jackson, the nominee had written
a memorandum supporting the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate but
equal" doctrine. 9 There are indications that, at the time, Justice
Jackson opposed upsetting Plessy, although he later joined in the
Court's unanimous decision undermining that case in Brown v. Board
of Education .8 Because a clerk's duties include preparation of posi-
tion papers, Rehnquist's memorandum could not reasonably be con-
strued as clear evidence of his personal views.
Also stemming from his work as Justice Jackson's clerk was an
article authored by Rehnquist in which he indicated that law clerks
were ideologically to the left of both the justices and the nation.8'
Interestingly, largely omitted in references to the article was the re-
mainder of Rehnquist's argument, in which he indicated that it was
specious to view law clerks as dominating Supreme Court Justices
inasmuch as the opportunities for bias affecting the clerks' work were
quite limited.12
Judicial Ethics and Conflict of Interest. The issue of the finan-
cial relationships of a judge with corporations and individuals in-
volved in past or possible future litigation before him caused Justice
Fortas to resign and raised troublesome questions over the Hayns-
worth nomination. At the time of Judge Parker's nomination, the
New York Times reported that a question was likely to be raised
concerning Parker's investments in utility securities; 3 however, the
matter was not pursued further. Assuming Parker was involved in
business activities similar to those engaged in by Judge Haynsworth,
the issue was perhaps not pressed because standards of judicial ethics
were less stringent thirty years ago. However, no scandal had pre-
ceded the -Parker nomination, whereas the Fortas controversy imme-
diately preceded Haynsworth's nomination. Although Charles Evans
Hughes had been accused of serving the interests of the wealthy-to
some, prima facie evidence of corruption or dishonesty-this accusa-
tion was a different issue from that of conflict of interests. Certainly,
standards for judges' withdrawal from participation in cases have
79. 163 U.S. 347 (1896).
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
81. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEws AND WORLD
REP., Dec. 13, 1957, reprinted in THE COURTS 166-69 (R. Scigliano ed. 1962).
82. Id. at 169.
83. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1930, at 18, col. 1.
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tightened in the intervening years, but the judge himself remains the
sole decider of the propriety of withdrawal in a particular case. The
issue of Haynsworth's stock purchases, which later proved to be his
undoing, first surfaced several years before the nomination. An inves-
tigation at the behest of Attorney General Robert Kennedy by Chief
Judge Sobeloff cleared Haynsworth of unethical conduct in connec-
tion with the Darlington Mills case. 8
Assessing the precise role of the ethics controversy in the rejection
of Judge Haynsworth's nomination is difficult. Unquestionably, ini-
tial opposition to Haynsworth had been rooted in partisan and ideo-
logical considerations, and if the opposition had remained at that
level, the nomination would almost certainly have been approved.
However, as in the case of Justice Fortas, those who sought to block
the nomination for political reasons uncovered evidence raising ques-
tions of ethical impropriety, a factor which may have changed the
views of some who had originally been expected to support the nomi-
nation. While most senators who voted against Judge Haynsworth
publicly attributed their opposition to the conflict of interest issue, it
is reasonable to speculate in the absence of evidence to the contrary
that the issue provided a convenient justification for olposition gener-
ated in fact by ideological or politicial considerations. The soundness
of this conclusion is supported by a recent study of the roll-call votes
on the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations which suggests that the
liberal-conservative orientation, not party or region of the voting
senators, was the important determinant of voting behavior.es
Presidential Strategy in the Confirmation Process
Presidential Support. As might reasonably be expected, the fac-
tor of presidential support has been significant in many controversial
nominations. Of course, presidential support is presumed by the fact
of nomination, and if the nomination is non-controversial, no addi-
tional exercise of presidential influence is required. However, if the
nominee incurs significant opposition, additional and overt presiden-
84. 115 CONG. REc. 10390 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1969). The investigation concluded in
February, 1964. However, at the time of Haynsworth's nomination to the Supreme Court,
Judge Winter, testifying in Haynsworth's behalf, did concede under questioning that he might
have handled differently the acquisition of stock in a company whose case had already been
decided but not published by his court.
85. M. Leavitt, Carswell and Haynsworth: An Elementary Study of Senate Voting, 1970
(unpublished manuscript).
Vol. 1972:557]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tial action becomes important.
President Wilson firmly supported Brandeis,"8 and this support
may have played a major part in deflating the opposition to the
nomination. President Eisenhower's support of Earl Warren is also
noteworthy in this regard. Objections to the Warren nomination in-
volved the propriety of the President's making appointmenti'during
a congressional recess as well as a demand by Senator Willian Langer
for patronage for small states."7 Attempting to achieve his goal by
intensive examination of minor complaints in the case of Warren,
Senator Langer aired his charges at a hearing of the Judiciary Com-
mittee. Following the hearing, President Eisenhower promptly and
strongly defended his nominee with a public statement and a letter
to the Committee,8 thereby indicating firm White House support for
the nominee.
Presidents have not always restricted themselves to public state-
ments in attempting to marshal support for a nominee. For example,
President Hoover, while maintaining a "low profile," called in three
senators from his own party to gain support for Judge Parker's
nomination.89 However, presidential support may, in fact, not be
effective, as is demonstrated by the failure of President Johnson's
efforts on behalf of Justice Fortas' nomination for Chief Justice;
indeed, this support, in view of the charges of "cronyism" leveled
against Justice Fortas, may actually have been embarrassing.
President Nixon's strategy with respect to the nominations of
Judges Haynsworth and Carswell provides an interesting contrast in
the use of presidential power. Actively supporting both nominations,
the President exerted heavy pressure in Haynsworth's behalf virtually
from the time the nomination was first challenged in the Senate. The
President devoted a special news conference to the defense of Hayns-
worth, where a detailed refutation of the conflict of interest charges
made against the nominee was presented." Unwilling to stop with
such a refutation, President Nixon further argued that senators
86. See TODD 133-139.
87. See McKay, supra note 7, at 133-34; cf GROSSMAN 118. See also 100 CoNG. REc. 2045
(1945) (remarks of Senator Langer).
88. Support from within the Administration also came from Attorney General Brownell,
Deputy Attorney General Rogers, and Vice President Nixon. The only negative votes cast in
Committee were those of Democrats Eastland, Johnston and Kilgore.
89. Hoover later wrote about senators who "ran out" on him. 2 H. HOOVER, supra note
- 36, at 269.
90. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1969, at 34.
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should not take a judge's philosophy into account in making a confir-
mation decision and indicated strong disagreement with senators who
would vote against confirmation on the basis of a disagreement with
a nominee's political or legal philosophy."
Judge Carswell's nomination, like Haynsworth's, was considered
a part of President Nixon's "southern strategy. 92 Carswell, impecca-
ble in his financial dealings, encountered more opposition from
blacks and white liberals than did Judge Haynsworth.13 Because of
resentment by Republican senators who previously had been the ob-
ject of "arm-twisting" tactics, the President adopted a more cautious
approach with respect to the Carswell nomination. Accordingly,
there was little initial overt White House pressure; however, later,
when the nomination was in trouble, President Nixon tried to apply
a different kind of pressure through his letter to Senator Saxbe,94
which, as suggested, did not halt the trend away from Carswell. The
Administration, in a defensive position throughout the Carswell af-
fair, was caught short-handed by revelations of Carswell's racial
statement and was unprepared to respond to other allegations about
Carswell's alleged support of racial segregation, indicating that nei-
ther Nixon nor his Attorney General knew very much about the man
they had nominated to the Supreme Court.95 In the final analysis, the
91. Id. cols. 3-5.
92. In fact, two national columnists suggested that because of this strategy, Attorney
General Mitchell twice refused Haynsworth's request that his name he withdrawn. Evans &
Novak, Mitchell's Strategy on Haynsworth Strains Republican Party Relations, The Washing-
ton Post, Nov. 24, 1969, at A-13, col. 1. Judge Haynsworth subsequently denied that he had
made such a request. The confirmation of Lewis Powell, after the attempt to name Rep.
Richard Poff (R., Va.) was aborted when he withdrew from consideration, has probably satis-
fied whatever obligations President Nixon had in this regard.
It is also possible that Parker's nomination resulted from the "southern strategy" of a
Republican President. While Hoover's Attorney General did indicate in a memorandum to the
Senate Judiciary Committee that the fact that the Fourth Circuit had not been represented on
the Supreme Court in many years played a part in Parker's selection, he claimed that a search
for nominees had been made in several circuits, not all of which were southern. A Department
of Interior official urged selection of Parker in order to reward North Carolina and the South
for electoral support of Hoover, but there is no way of knowing the actual effect of his
suggestion. Hoover insisted that his Attorney General had demanded "quality and character
on the bench," but did indicate that "regional distribution of justices had always been regarded
as of some importance." 2 H. HOOVER, supra note 36, at 268.
93. E.g., Hearings [on the Nomination of G. Harrold Carswell], supra note 33, at 134, 235.
94. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
95. A developing credibility gap increased when the Justice Department ignored the re-
quests of several senators to meet privately with Carswell. As most of the senators in this group
were otherwise likely to vote against Carswell, the meeting could not have hurt, and might have
helped.
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Administration's support and pressure did not provide individual sen-
ators with ample reasons to take the political risks involved in sup-
porting the nomination. Thus, the President's strategy defied a basic
criterion of effective use of presidential power-persuading individu-
als that what the President desires is in their own interest as well."
President Nixon's presentation of the nominations of Powell and
Rehnquist-his principal "intervention" with respect to those nomi-
nations-was quite significant. The nominees were generally a sur-
prise, coming as they did after the release of a list of six possible
nominees, with the clear indication that Herschel Friday and Mildred
Lillie were those preferred." Before President Nixon's nationally tele-
vised nomination speech, it had become clear that the ABA commit-
tee was negatively disposed to both Friday and Lillie and that their
prospects for receiving Senate approval were poor.9" Whether the
"list of six" was a smokescreen meant to draw off the opposition of
the Senate liberals or whether President Nixon simply managed to
extricate himself from another situation in which the Justice Depart-
ment had allowed the recommendation of less than superbly qualified
nominees is unclear. In either case, the President's dramatic an-
nouncement was clearly helpful to the nominees' cause.
Timing of Nominations. The timing of both the Parker and
Haynsworth nominations appears significant. The strength and
effectiveness of the opposition that developed is highlighted because
the Haynsworth nomination, early in Nixon's term of office, should
have benefited from some residual "halo" effect from his election.
Hoover's nomination of Parker was late in the term, after the so-
called "honeymoon" with Congress had waned.9 Furthermore, the
Parker nomination occurred shortly after the controversy over the
While this information lag proved acutely embarrassing to the Nixon Administration, it
may have reflected bad luck rather than a unique incompetence. The evidence suggests that
the intelligence system by which both the ABA Committee on Federal Judiciary and the Justice
Department get their information on prospective judicial candidates is sporadic rather than
systematic. The Kennedy Administration was misled several times about the segregationist
vieqvs of prospective federal judges in the South. See V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 265-66
(1970). See generally GROSSMAN 108-13.
96. Cf R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 7 (1960).
97. Nixon's Court: Its Making and Its Meaning, TIME, Nov. 1, 1971, at 16-17.
98. The probability of a protracted fight over Rep. Poff had caused him to have his name
withdrawn earlier. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
99. Professor Scigliano argues that nominations made in the first three years of a Presi-
dent's term have generally been accepted. Nominations in the last year of a term or in a lame-
duck period have had much less success. R. SCIGLIANO, supra note 59, at 98.
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nomination of Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice."0 While
Hughes was confirmed, sixty-two to twenty-six, there had been strong
minority opposition from Progressive Republicans led by Senator
Norris. Thus, when Parker's name was submitted to the Senate, there
was already controversy and political opposition to the President over
a judicial appointment. 10 As to President Nixon's nominations, while
the nomination of Warren Burger as Chief Justice prior to the nomi-
nation of Judge Haynsworth had been confirmed with less protracted
opposition, there had been significant liberal dissatisfaction with the
Burger appointment, particularly over his views and prior decisions
on criminal procedure. However, more important to the Haynsworth
controversy than the residual effect of a prior contested nomination
are the two battles over Abe Fortas-first, over his nomination as
Chief Justice and second, over the conflict of interest charges which
led to his resignation in 1969. Nevertheless, in both the Haynsworth
and Parker cases, frustration by opposition senators over a previously
lost fight seems to have increased the nominee's vulnerability to at-
tack.
President Nixon chose to wait several months after Judge Hayns-
worth's defeat, presumably to let troubled waters calm somewhat,
before sending Judge Carswell's nomination to the Senate. However,
this delay may have been a mistake, because immediately after the
Haynsworth debate, the Senate was probably in a mood to confirm
virtually any nominee.0 2 Many senators who had opposed Hayns-
worth were concerned with possible damage to the Court resulting
from the Fortas and Haynsworth conflict of interest charges, and it
seems likely that Carswell might have been approved had his nomina-
tion been submitted earlier. Indeed, when the nomination was an-
nounced, there seemed little inclination to contest the selection by
many of the liberals and moderates whose coalition had defeated
Haynsworth, but an additional delay of several months permitted
revitalization of the coalition, which then produced damaging evi-
dence against Carswell.
Timing also appeared to be important in the Rehnquist confirma-
100. See generally 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 648-62 (1951). Hughes had been
attacked as a "tool of capitalism" and for encouraging political activity on the part of Supreme
Court Justices by resigning in 1916 to run for President. Id. at 655.
101. Harlan Fiske Stone attributed Parker's rejection in part "to the debate and hard
feeling that was stirred up over the Hughes nomination." MASON 300.
102. See Reston, Washington: President Nixon's Gamble, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1970, at
36, col. 3.
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tion. The Powell and Rehnquist nominations came toward the end of
the congressional session when the Senate was attempting to expedite
completion of its business. Moreover, the nomination of Earl Butz
as Secretary of Agriculture, confirmed by a close margin, had ex-
hausted considerable Senate energy. Furthermore, substantial Senate
attention had been devoted to attacks upon the anticipated nomina-
tions first of Congressman Poff and then of Friday and Lillie.
Nominee's Appearance Before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The significance of a nominee's appearance before the Judiciary
Committee is indicated by the case of Harlan Fiske Stone. Although
Stone's nomination to the Court by President Coolidge resulted in
sentiments to the effect that the nominee had been "kicked upstairs"
because of his firmness as Attorney General and because he was
overly aggressive with respect to antitrust matters,10 3 major opposi-
tion within the Senate did not seem likely. However, one Ownbey,
disgruntled over a lawsuit between himself and J.P. Morgan, who had
been represented by Stone, demanded that Stone not be confirmed.'"4
Ownbey found a champion in Senator Heflin of Georgia,' 5 but the
nature of the attack pressed by Senator Heflin drew attention away
from other issues which might have arisen, such as Stone's relation
to "big money" interests. It was Stone's handling of the case, not his
representation of Morgan, which drew Ownbey's ire.'
After the delay caused by the Ownbey matter, the Judiciary Com-
mittee approved the nomination.0 7 However, Senator Walsh of Mon-
tana attacked Stone on the Senate floor in an executive session for
his role as Attorney General in a matter involving Montana's other
senator, Burton Wheeler.0 8 Senator Wheeler had been indicted for
practicing as an attorney before a government agency while serving
as a senator. A Senate committee exonerated Wheeler, but Stone had
refused to drop the charges and had instituted an expanded investiga-
tion into the matter,0 9 a fact which gave rise to Senator Walsh's
opposition. After Stone, contrary to custom, expressed a willingness
to appear before the Judiciary Committee in a public session, the
103. While Coolidge may have wanted him out of the way, there was also a "pull" from
the Court-Taft seems to have played a role in the nomination. MASON 184.
104. See id. at 185-88.
105. See 66 CONG. REc. 2511, 3046 (1925).
106. MASON 187.
107. Id. at 146.
108. Id. at 188-96.
109. Thorpe, supra note 6, at 375.
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Senate unanimously sent the nomination back to Committee. Stone's
appearance before the Committee "was a complete success for the
Republican party and a personal trimph for himself." 110 Even Senator
Walsh changed his position and abstained on the confirmation vote
instead of opposing Stone.
It has been suggested that Judge Parker's failure to testify person-
ally diminished his prospects for confirmation."' A personal appear-
ance before the Judiciary Committee might have removed doubts
about his views on racial issues, but since such was not the custom
at the time, Parker did not appear.12 Judge Haynsworth, on the other
hand, appeared before the Judiciary Committee personally, pursuant
to current custom. Whether his appearance affected the votes of any
senators on the Committee is unclear, although the refusal to address
himself to charges of unethical conduct-as opposed to charges of
mere political oraitory-might well have been damaging. With Judge
Carswell, the problem turned out not to be an appearance before the
Judiciary Committee, which he made in due course, but the failure
of the Department of Justice to arrange for the nominee to meet
privately with key senators. As is now accepted practice, both Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist appeared to testify."' When a variety of
allegations concerning the latter nominee surfaced after his two-day
hearing, Rehnquist- sent affidavits denying the charges to Judiciary
Committee Chairman Eastland."4 This action, however, was consid-
ered insufficient for the Committee's dissenting senators, who tried
unsuccessfully to schedule another day of hearings and who attacked
the nominee for failing to clarify matters adequately for the Senate.",
Group Support or Opposition
Organized support or opposition by special interest groups has
been crucial in several nominations and is probably more influential
at the pre-nomination stage, because a President generally will not
designate a nominee strongly opposed by groups associated with the
fortunes of his own party. However, as might be expected, groups
10. MASON 197.
111. Thorpe, supra note 6, at 374-75.
112. Id. at 375.
113. Rehnquist appeared before the Committee on two different days, Nov. 3 & 4, 1971.
Powell made only one appearance, on Nov. 8, 1971. Hearings on Powell & Rehnquist 16, 137,
201.
114. Id. at 486-92.
115. 117 CONG. REc. 20550 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1971).
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normally not associated with the President's party are unlikely to be
influential in opposing the nomination unless they can provide sub-
stantial evidence demonstrating either the candidate's complete lack
of qualifications or his adherence to views unacceptable to either
political party. In the case of Brandeis, to neutralize opposition from
leading segments of the bar, supporters of the nomination made staff
help available to the Judiciary Committee, thereby presenting their
position directly to the senators. Also, despite the opposition to the
nomination by many prestigious lawyers, a marked division of opin-
ion in the legal community existed with considerable support for the
nomination coming from law professors.*"I A split of practicing attor-
neys and professors over a nomination also occurred in the Hayns-
worth and Carswell nominations with the professors opposing and the
practitioners supporting confirmation.
The coalition of groups opposing both Judges Parker and Hayns-
worth and the ideological and policy basis for their opposition per-
haps provides the strongest parallel between the two rejections. The
principal components of the coalition were the NAACP and organ-
ized labor, joined by liberal Democrats and progressive Republicans.
In both instances there was an element of political hostility toward
the nominating President, a factor which was difficult to separate
from opposition to the nominees themselves.
The NAACP and labor based their opposition to Parker on single
events-the former on Parker's statement made when he was a Re-
publican candidate for Governor of North Carolina,' 7 the latter on
his decision in UMW v. Red Jacket."8 In the Haynsworth contro-
versy labor again premised its opposition on a single case."' While
the basis of the NAACP's opposition to Haynsworth was somewhat
more complicated, essentially the organization maintained that
the nominee had not carried out the spirit of the Brown decision
but had, on the contrary, approved a variety of school desegrega-
116. For example, the Harvard Law School Faculty was pro-Brandeis, even though Presi-
dent Lowell of Harvard opposed the nomination. TODD 258.
117. Neither Walter White of the NAACP nor William Green of the AFL appeared to
know more about Parker than these single events to which they objected, nor had they known
about Parker prior to his nomination. In fact, the North Carolina labor groups had first
endorsed Parker, either without knowing of, or in spite of, UMW v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal
& Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).
118. 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).
119. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded,
380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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tion plans designed to avoid rather than promote integration. 20
However, in both the Parker and Haynsworth cases, the underly-
ing reasons for NAACP and labor opposition went beyond particular
events. In reality, opposition may have been as much related to politi-
cal circumstances attendant to the nominations as to the individual
nominees themselves. At the time of the Parker nomination, both the
NAACP and labor had relatively little political power; consequently,
blocking the Parker nomination was a major symbolic victory for
both groups. Moreover, the opposition to Parker was a continuation
of the liberal attack on a conservative Court. Both organized labor
and the NAACP, stronger politically by the time of the Hayns-
worth,' Carswell and Rehnquist nominations, may have felt it neces-
sary to block the nominations to protect interests which they thought
Nixon's nominees would oppose if they were on the Supreme Court.
With their influence confined principally to the Democratic party, the
two groups perhaps felt compelled to strike at least a symbolic blow
against the judicial fruits of the President's "southern strategy" inas-
much as the prospect of a Republican President's appointing several
justices raised the spectre of the Supreme Court, long perceived as
the most liberal branch of government, moving substantially toward
the right. Unlike the Parker case, where opposition was motivated in
part by a desire to alter radically the policies of the Court, opposition
in the Haynsworth, Carswell and Rehnquist cases was a desperate
effort to maintain the Court's prevailing policies.
Lawyers and the ABA. The prospects for confirmation of Judges
Carswell and Haynsworth were diminished by severe criticism of
leading lawyers and law professors. The statement by the former
Dean of the Yale Law School, Louis Pollak, that Judge Carswell
"presents more slender credentials than any nominee for the Supreme
Court put forth in this century,"122 was widely quoted and apparently
widely believed.'2 As was well publicized, these statements provoked
120. A South Carolina labor union and some NAACP attorneys, counter to the views of
their national leadership, said that Haynsworth was a fair and honest judge. 115 CONG. REC.
34458 (1969).
121. In 1930, labor may have felt the need to demonstrate publicly its growing political
clout. Likewise, the NAACP was still a fledgling organization, dependent largely on white
liberals, and under attack from the Communist Party as being too conservative and establish-
ment oriented.
122. 116 CONG. REc. 2860 (1970).
123. See also the comment by Joseph Rauh, that Carswell is a "Judge Haynsworth with a
cutting edge. . . . with a bitterness and a meanness that Judge Haynsworth never had." 116
CONG. Rac. 2415 (1970).
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Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska to proclaim the need to repre-
sent mediocrity as well as ability on the Supreme Court, a statement
used effectively against Carswell.12 1
Carswell's nomination also failed to receive a strong endorsement
from the ABA's Committee on Federal Judiciary. The Committee
previously rated nominees to the federal bench as "exceptionally well
qualified," "very well qualified," or "not qualified." A development
adversely affecting the Carswell nomination occurred shortly after
the Haynsworth nomination when the Committee shifted to a "quali-
fied" or "unqualified" measure for Supreme Court nominations, rat-
ing Carswell "qualified"-by a majority rather than a unanimous
vote. 25 Standing alone, the term "qualified" Seemed to lend credence
to the charge that Carswell was rated as average, even though there
was no higher rating the Committee could have given him. In effect,
the ABA rating served only to reinforce other negative judgments
about Carwell's qualifications. 2 1 While there was isolated support for
Carswell from laywers and local bar groups, the preponderance of
legal opinion was negative.'
The problems of the ABA with respect to its rating system as
applied to Carswell led to another modification of the system. Begin-
ning with the nomination of Justice Blackmun, the ratings were
changed to "not qualified," "not opposed," or "meet high standards
of integrity, judicial temperament and professional competence."' 28
The ABA also gained from the Attorney General a concession to the
effect that the former practice of allowing the Committee on Federal
124. The claim about Carswell's competency provides a parallel to the nomination of
McKenna at the end of the last century. The defense of McKenna by Senator White, Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee, was that McKenna was not a legal giant but was competent. Cf
W. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 228-30 (1950).
125. The ABA had decided in 1962 to use only "qualified" or "unqualified" with respect
to the Supreme Court because the nominations were not cleared with the Committee in ad-
vance. It then shifted to "highly acceptable," "acceptable," or "not acceptable" from the
viewpoint of professional qualifications prior to Haynsworth's nomination. See generally
GROSSMAN 75-80; Walsh, Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 56 A.B.A.J. 555 (1970). See
note 128 infra.
126. GROSSMAN 75-80.
127. For example, the faculty of Florida State University Law School, of which Carswell
was a founder, opposed the nomination. 116 CONG. REC. 10245 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Tydings).
128. Cf Report of the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, in 95 REPORTS OF TH1
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 1970, at 711 (1971).
The Committee's report notes the differing ratings given the three nominees, but offers no
explanation for the rating system changes.
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Judiciary to evaluate all possible nominees for a Supreme Court
position, rather than simply the one man already selected, would be
resumed." 9 It is likely that this change was less a result of ABA
prodding than of the Justice Department's embarrassment over what
post-nomination investigations revealed about Haynsworth and Cars-
well.
This shift to allowing the Committee to make prior evaluations
led to the first instances in which the Committee had ever made a
negative recommendation on Supreme Court nominees. The
Committee voted eleven to one that Judge Lillie was unqualified.3 0
With eight votes necessary for a "qualified" rating, it voted six to six
on Herschel Friday, who thus came out "not opposed." '' Irritated
by the supposed leak of the nominees' names, President Nixon an-
nounced, at the same time that the Powell and Rehnquist nomina-
tions were made, that the ABA would no longer enjoy the opportun-
ity to make its evaluations before the Supreme Court nominations
were submitted to the Senate.'
CONCLUSION
The Senate's consideration of Supreme Court nominations in the
twentieth century is notable because of the routine treatment and high
expectation of confirmation in most cases. Of the long delays in about
one-fourth of the nominations, some were caused by substantial op-
position, rendering eventual confirmation questionable, but in others,
delays resulted from a variety of idiosyncratic reasons not initially
regarded as threats. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved all
but one nomination, with relatively few dissenting votes cast by
Committee members, and there was generally little delay between the
Committee's report and confirmation by the full Senate. While all of
the defeated nominations encountered substantial delays, so did a
miscellany of others which were not seriously threatened. Delay in
many cases seemed related to regional constituency interests of mi-
nority bloc senators, or attempts to embarrass the President or criti-
cize the Supreme Court, rather than serious efforts to defeat a nomi-
nation. In some cases delaying tactics were used to postpone a final
129. Letter from Attorney General J. Mitchell to B. Segal, President of American Bar
Ass'n, reprinted in Report, supra note 128, at 713 (1971).
130. Nixon's Court: Its Making and Its Meaning, supra note 97, at 17.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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determination until additional unfavorable information and/or oppo-
sition votes could be obtained. However, as a general proposition, the
confirmation process has been based on the assumption that the Pres-
ident should be allowed to make any reasonable choice and that the
"burden of proof" as to a nominee's lack of qualifications must be
sustained by the opposition. Thus, an effective strategy of opposition
entails mobilizing a majority of senators against the President and
developing positive reasons as to why a particular nominee should not
be confirmed-not merely vague opposition or a preference for un-
named others who might have received the nomination.
Since World War II, Supreme Court nominations have been
characterized by longer delays, more lengthy and detailed hearings
by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a fuller participation in these
hearings by the nominee himself. A result of the Fortas, Carswell and
Haynsworth cases may be to increase the range of investigative in-
quiry engaged in by the Senate. At present, the Senate Judiciary
Committee has no formal investigative apparatus and relies for the
most part on information supplied to it by the executive branch;
however, it seems unlikely that this practice can or will continue.
Until now, the burden of combating information provided by the
Administration has fallen on the opposition, but the unreliability
and incompleteness of information accompanying the nominations of
Haynsworth and Carswell may make it imperative for the Senate
Judiciary Committee, for its own protection, to develop and insti-
tutionalize investigative practices. Also, future nominees will un-
doubtedly be required to provide more information concerning their
backgrounds and, in particular, about their financial dealings. The
development of these trends will further dilute the assumptions of
presidential prerogatives. The new concern over judicial ethics
brought about by the Haynsworth and Fortas nominations will un-
doubtedly provide a surrogate for opposition on partisan or ideologi-
cal grounds which might otherwise be regarded as illegitimate. There
appears to be no weakening of presidential prerogative to nominate
almost exclusively members of his own party or those with whom he
has an ideological affinity, but there appears to have developed a
fairly strong barrier to anyone whose views on racial questions are
suspect, as is the case with other "extremist" policy views.'
133. The confirmation of Mr. Rehnquist, whose views on racial equality and the use of the
law to combat discrimination were at best ambiguous, might at first glance appear to contradict
this assertion. It is more likely, however, that the evidence against him was not as persuasive
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These developments suggest possible changes in the strategies of
future Presidents with respect to making nominations and expediting
Senate confirmation. Presidents may be well advised to justify their
choices more extensively and to increase consultation with Senate
leaders, thus co-opting their support when the nomination is actually
presented. Much in the manner that Senate leaders are regularly
included in treaty delegations, they perhaps may also have to be
consulted informally regarding Supreme Court nominations. Also,
Presidents may be ill-advised to utilize certain heavy pressure tactics,
perhaps legitimate in support of major legislation, but which enraged
a number of senators at critical points in the Haynsworth and Cars-
well cases. Such tactics seem peculiarly inappropriate where the Pres-
ident's party does not control the Senate. 34
The close scrutiny likely to be given to a nominee's background
makes it almost inevitable that damaging evidence can be found.
Most of the controversial Supreme Court nominations in the twen-
tieth century involved men who have had intricate financial and busi-
ness dealings. It was, therefore, not suprising to find some of these
individuals to have been involved in, or connected with, actions
which, though not illegal, appear in retrospect ill-advised and indica-
tive of faulty judgment. Likewise, anyone who serves as a judge is
likely to have made decisions which either were in error or incurred
the ill-will of formidable enemies. Thus, despite the current rhetoric
of the bar and many politicans favoring prior judicial experience as
a prerequisite to appointment, Presidents may find it preferable to
give appointments to men with different and less vulnerable back-
grounds.
as in the case of Carswell. Rehnquist's opposition to a public accommodations statute in
Phoenix was based on an asserted lack of governmental power to regulate individual behavior
in this way. For some opponents this was merely sophisticated racism, but for others, it did
not exceed acceptable limits.
134. It has already been suggested that President Nixon's novel television announcement
of the Rehnquist and Powell nominations was an effective device. See note 98 supra and
accompanying text. He made it clear that his nominees share his judicial philosophy of strict
construction of the Constitution, and that they were committed to a "law and order" philoso-
phy. It was, by all odds, a sophisticated appeal for political support for confirmation.
The utility of pressure tactics will, of course, vary with the situation at hand. It has been
suggested, off the record, that President Nixon "held hostages" by not submitting the names
of nominees to other judicial vacancies until Powell and Rehnquist were confirmed. If this was
indeed true, then it is clear that the President was anticipating a close showdown vote. Since
the votes for confirmation were not close, it is not clear what effect such tactics might have
had.
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Finally, the rejections of Haynsworth and Carswell may lend ad-
ditional support to those who have advocated radical changes in the
process of selecting federal judges. There are two ways of assessing
the performance of the Senate in light of the Carswell and Hayns-
worth nominations. One could argue that in rejecting both men, the
Senate demonstrated the efficacy and need for its services in the
selection of judges. In both cases, the Senate clearly played the con-
stitutional role assigned to it by obtaining a relatively comprehensive
view of the values and abilities of each of the nominees and by making
an independent assessment of the qualifications of a presidential
nominee. Throughout the confirmation process, senatorial opponents
of both Haynsworth and Carswell were able to elicit substantial infor-
mation about both candidates which was overlooked or not revealed
by the executive branch. The Senate's actions, whatever one might
think of them substantively, reflect not a passive but an active role
for the Senate in Supreme Court nominations.
On the other hand, the spectacle of the President and the Senate
locked in combat over the Supreme Court for nearly a year is un-
doubtedly disturbing to many who feel that the Court should be
allowed to remain aloof from the political arena. It has been sug-
gested that because the Court is not a truly political institution the
selection of Supreme Court Justices through an inherently political
process is inconsistent with the role and functions of the Court. A
number of alternatives have been suggested by the organized bar,
including a federal version of the "Missouri Plan" by which judges
are selected in some states. 3 1 Under the proposal, a bi-partisan nom-
inating commission would, for each vacancy on the Court, submit to
the President two or three names from which the President could
choose one. The nomination would still require Senate confirmation.
Some supporters of the proppsal would go further and, through a
constitutional amendment, eliminate the role of the Senate entirely.
The commission would be composed of lawyers and laymen in equal
numbers and chaired by the Chief Justice or, if the position to be
filled was the Chief Justiceship, by the senior associate justice on the
Court. The lay members would be chosen by the President and the
lawyer-members by the bar. The avowed purpose would be to take
the selection of judges "out of politics." However, the unstated pur-
135. See, e.g., R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR
(1969).
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pose and result would be to increase the power of the bar over judicial
nominations.
The problem with this plan is that, rather than eliminating politics
from the selection process, the scheme would only transfer the forum
in which politics would operate. One set of political actors would be
replaced by another, namely administratively chosen laymen and
lawyers instead of popularly elected senators. It is probably unlikely
that such a panel would, over the long run, make selections substan-
tially different from those nominated during the last several decades.
However, a result of the plan would be to lessen the visibility of the
selection process, as well as the already low visibility of the Court
itself.136 Such a plan might increase confidence in the Court for some
lawyers, but it would probably reduce public confidence in the Court
and further remove it from the mainstream of American politics. In
an age of momentous social change, the Court has become to some
Americans the only responsive governmental institution. The Court
can remain responsive only if its members are recruited from the
ranks of those with both political and legal experience and selected
by others who have similar experience. The tortuous process by which
the Senate rejected Judges Haynsworth and Carswell is a far more
democratic and useful procedure than the process contemplated by
the "Missouri Plan." It is also inherently preferable to the President's
claim to virtually sole dominion over the selection of Supreme Court
Justices.
136. See Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A
Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, in
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 273, 276-80 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus, eds. 1969).
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